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Colin Tumbull draws on theatrical performance to characterise the transfor-
mative power of ritual -making visible the invisible [1990]. My paper is a critique 
of that very anthropological approach to ritual which has kept the self invisible. 
I am concemed here with an instance of initiation ritual. My subject is social 
identity and its symbolisation. During the last few years, I have been pleading 
somewhat plaintively for anthropologists to address the mystery of the self. Histo-
rically, the self has been treated as determined or licensed by society, and as defi-
ned by the other people with whom the individual interacts. Rather than trying to 
appreciate-if not to reveal - the mystery, we have glossed over it by inventing the 
self in the image of our own theoretical models, either of the societies with which 
we were dealing, or of the more generalised nature of the relationship between 
individual and society. In a recent series of papers, I have attempted to focus atten-
tion on the tendency for individuals' perceptions of their selves to be lost or igno-
red in anthropological and other social discourse by our generalisation of them in 
to ethnicity, locality, sect, class orm other collective category [seeCohen,1989; in 
press(a),(b )and(c)]. 
In this paper I wish to illustrate my argument at a more personallevel by 100-
king at naming as a ritual means of initiating the person in to an identity, explana-
tions of which almost invariably privilege the social definition of the individual 
over his/her self-concept. I will pose the question of why naming, apparentIy such 
a routine event, is nevertheless accompanied by-ritual and is thereby given special 
significance. For the purposes of this paper, I leave aside the naming ritual s of the 
Great religious Traditions, for reasons both of practicality and theological comple-
xity. 
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In a paper published nearly forty years ago, Lucile Charles suggested that the 
rituals which attend the giving of original names are much less 'dramatic' than 
those for subsequent name changes [Charles, 1951]. I will return is due course to 
this matter, strange to us, of succession in a person's naming career. Yet the record 
shows that name-giving is frequentIy a ritual affair [see Alford, 1987, pp.47ff.], 
dramatic or not. Why should this be so? 
Anthropologists who have been schooled in Van Gennep's and Turner's 
analyses of rites de passage, and in the cross-cultural study of classification sys-
tems, may well be inclined to answer that the ritual of naming terminates the dan-
gerously ambiguous condition of liminality - of being, in Turner's phrase, 'betwixt 
and between', neither one thing, nor the other: biologically,but not yet socially, 
constituted; a presence, but not yet a member. Naming, as Lévi-Strauss pointed 
out, is a mode of classification, and classification is a necessary condition of pos-
session [1966]. Following his logic, naming is required for a society to possess a 
person, that is, to make that person a member. It does not often confer full mem-
bership: that remains a task for future rite of initiation. Rather, it confers socialness 
[Alford, 1987, p.29], possibly in a way which signals sorne of the conventions of 
social organisation. I shall refer to instances of these later on. One aspect of this 
minimal socialness may be the propitiation of ancestors or spirits who are themsel-
ves integral elements of the society; or of a God, gods, or religious precepts which, 
similarly, are major referents in the socety's identity. 
The evidence for this kind of interpretation is very powerful. It suggests that 
the point of such ritual is to confer socialness, rather than selfhood: that is to say, 
the performance of ritual which sacralises the conferment of a social identity also 
. minimises the mystery of the self, either by concealing it, or by making the self in 
a social image, or both. This is largely the view that anthropology took in the past. 
We are coming gradually to recognise that it is inadequate: for, in concentrating on 
the social construction of self, it ignored self-consciousness, the prized capacity 
for reflection which we so value in ourselves and which the naive intellectual tra-
ditions of western scholarship led us to deny in cultural others. In recent years we 
have become aware of the theoretical, methodological and literary artifices by 
which we created the Other as qualitatively different. At the same time, the deve-
lopment of symbolic anthropology has revealed the personal discretion which indi-
viduals exercise in their interpretation of symbols. We can no longer render the 
self as a mere replicate in miniature of society or social group. A fresh look at rites 
of naming may therefore suggest the tensions which inhere in the relationship of 
individual to society, tensions which are trivialised if regarded as capable of their 
mechanical resolution trough ritual. 
Since I found it in my fieldnotes and used it recently in a paper about the self 
and individuality, I have been tormented by the interpretations which might be put 
upon a statement made by a whalsay man that he had 'a right' to 'be himself'. 
What kind of right? legal? natural? Is it a right if it is merely proclaimed by him, 
but - and this was obviously his complaint - not recognised by others? The word 
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now has such cornmon currency: human rights, political rights, gay rights, the 
right to self-determination (whatever that may mean), states' rights, natural rights, 
animal rights, the right to life ... Bemard Crick has waned that we have so abused 
verbally a precious idea that we risk rendering it quite meaningless [1990, p.5]. The 
political theorist, the lawyer, perhaps even the philosopher, rnight so argue; the 
anthropologist cannot, for we must proceed from ordinary language, from the 
common, audible verbal currency, and 'rights', however debased semantically it 
may have become, remains an extraordinarily powerful idea. The effect of its 
deployment is to transform a mere claim into an axiom, a proposition which is not 
subject to the disciplines of proof. 
In ordinary speech, it is clearly the case that 'rights' goes far beyond the legal 
sphere. We ordinarily use 'rights' in a relational, rather than just an absolute, 
sense: to assert, say, the entitlements of a wife vis-a-vis her husband; the worker in 
respect of the management: the right to be heard, to an opinion, to work, and so on. 
Indeed, in ordinary discourse, the assertion of 'rights' may well be in contradiction 
to the law. Another instance from my notebook is the statement made by a prorni-
nent whalsay skipper after he had been acquitted by the Sheriff's Court in Lerwick 
of having flouted quota restrictions on North Sea herring. His lawyer was able to 
demonstrate that the hapless young arresting naval officer was unable in court to 
distinguish a herring from a pilchard. Months later and still passionate with indig-
nation, the skipper said to me, " How dare they stop me from fishing? It's my 
right. I'm a Shetlander and a whalsayman. I'm doing what my father did, and his 
afore him. It's got nothing to do with the law. If I can get fish out of the sea, it's 
my right. The politicians and judges can say it's illegal, but they can't say it's not 
my right." Now, this is very complicated, is it not? For here is a view, not of natu-
ral rights (for he would deny the same entitlement to Dane or Frenchman in she-
tland waters), obviously not of legal rights (for he rejects these as offensive), but 
of a right which inheres in his localness and is warranted by his skill, knowledge, 
need and by custom. In his view, the right can be impeded by the law but can not 
be invalidated by it. In effect he is saying the same as my first complainant: take 
away my right to fish, and you take away my right to be my self. 
Now, the right to be one self has no legal foundation: not in the legal systems 
of the United Kingdom, nor, so far as I can discover, in any body of law anywhere 
- though, of course, I stand to be corrected. Indeed, one will find widespread disa-
greement about who has the right to determine who a person is: the person in ques-
tion? Or the others with whom that person interacts? Here I raise the problem of 
identity in a very broad way and, as I suggested earlier, this problem is replicated 
in social science practice which generally treats identiy either as imposed upon a 
person by the Other; or as formulated by a person through the reflective process in 
which he relates himself symbolically to the other. Whether as passive recipient or 
as active agent, the self in social science has been largely a social constructo The 
view I would oppose to this orthodoxy is of the individual as 'authorial' of 'self-
directing' . 
149 
Anthropology has long been uncomfortable with 'the self'. Generally in the 
literature, the 'person' is treated as a socially constituted entity, endowed with 
rights and obligations, a component of the social mechanism [see Carrithers et al, 
eds., 1985; Harré, 1987]. The 'individual' is a rather less precise entity, visually 
observable but theoretically problematic. How individual is an individual? The 
'self' is the most elusive of these three: Mead's '1', an aware being capable of 
reflection. Harré implies that the self is a culture-specific notion and refers to'that 
inner unity to which all personal experience belongs" ,(1987, p.51). For Nikolas 
Rose, the notion of a private self, or 'soul', is a chimera, for our 'sbjectivities' 
have been comprehensively invaded by, and shaped to the interests of those who 
exercise power over uso In his new book, Governing the Soul [1990], he argues 
that our mentalities have been transformed into, what Foucault neatIy called, 
'governmentalities'. Bureaucrats, professionals, managers, therapists and adverti-
sers have turned the self into public space within which they all pursue their own 
interests. The self has been occupied and alienated. 
Anthropologists have long debated the question of whether the concept of 
'self' is as culturally specific, as Eurocentric and as vulnerable as these rather pes-
simistic discussions imply. 1 am certain that it is not. But let us simply accept, if 
we may, a proposition which would be valid for most of us - that it is possible to 
distinguish conceptually and experientiaHy between the caracterisation of a person 
made by others and expressed in her or his social identity; and that person's self-
concept. Our ability to make this distinction anthropologically follows from the 
development of modern anthropological approaches to culture, symbolism and 
meaning. 
As these went through their more recent paradigm shifts, so the possibility 
and usefulness of generalising and stipulating the meanings of symbols was incre-
asingly questioned. Writers emphasised the element of symbolic interpretation 
which is not generalisable because it is personal and inarticulate or unarticulated. 
Scholars as different in background and orientation as Firth and Fernandez addres-
sed themselves to, respectively, the 'private' and the 'inchoate' in symbolism, rat-
her than to the explicit and specifiable. The power of symbols, in this view, derives 
from what can be left unspecified and unspoken. Later still, we reach a dialogic 
genre in which symbolic forms are regarded as being incapable of translation at 
aH, either because they lack analogues (as in Barth's account of serial initiation 
among the Bakhtaman of the New Guinea Highlands [1975]); or because they are 
self-referential (as in Roy Wagner's depictions of Daribi ritual and 'lethal speech' 
[1978]); or because they are inexpressible other than in their original form (as in 
Taussig's rendering of Colombian narcotic rituals [1986]); or because they are, 
quite simply, devoid of meaning, as Barley suggests for the instuments of Camero-
onian Dowayo ritual [1983]. 
We need only to note that, with each stage of this theoretical progression, the 
nature of symbolism and of the process of symbolic interpretation is conceptually 
transformed to allow more discretion to the individual, the self. The meanings of 
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symbols are no longer thought of as being 'handed down' from on cultural high. 
Theforms may be received, but as media for the individual's more or les s uncons-
trained construction of meaning, which may or may not coincide with that of 
others. Individuals make meaning using shared cultural devices. 
If initiation rites and names are read in this light, you will readily appreciate 
that they tell different kinds of story than their earlier ethnographers lead us to sup-
pose. We may now have to deal with as many 'texts' of the ritual as there are pati-
cipants, for we are theoretically bound to acknowledge each of them as authors. 
This dialectie of the individual as (a) socially constituted, and (b) as 'autho-
rial' lies behind most dilernmas of identity and their analysis in social science. It is 
manifest in many discussions of naming although a great and obvious lacuna in the 
literature on naming is ethnography which deals substantially and descriptively 
with people's experience of being named and with the meanings they impute to 
their names as symbols or icons of themselves. As 1 mentioned earlier, many wri-
ters have drawn attention to the light shed by conventions of naming upon the 
nature of the societies in which they occur. For example, there is the use of local 
ancestors' names to stress continuity and the primacy of affiliation to the descent 
group; or, conversely, of the parent's choice of an affinal forebear's name to 
express the importance of the child's bl1ateral descent [Rossi, 1965]; there is the 
French requirement to use an officially approved saint's name, not to indicate alle-
giance to the saint nor even to the Church but, according to the socio-linguist 
Monique Léon, to France herself [Léon, 1976]. In an ingenious study of naming in 
te Bigouden-sud region of Brittany, Segalen finds in the naming of children after 
their godparents a reflection of the conditions of life and death in the Nineteenth 
century, for it created a 'spiritual bond' with godparents who, with life expectancy 
being very uncertain, were frequently required to as sume the responsibilities of 
parenthood [Segalen, 1980, p.69]. 
Anthropologists have also looked extensively at the putative meanings of 
names: at whether these are descriptive, predictive, both, or are merely arbitrary. 
They have also raised the paradox that while the name is, in a sense, the indivi-
dual's possession (although names are ubiquitously claimed as the property of a 
group) , a hook for the individual's identity, it is usually bestowed by others and 
obligates the individual in its use [Zonabend, 1980, pp. 7,15]. Implicit in many of 
these issues, and sometimes raised explicitly, is my own topie: the confrontation of 
individual and society. 
Because the naming forms we have discovered among 'other cultures' appear 
unfamiliar, we have constructed them as sociologically significant, and have 
simply assumed that they model the individual, the self. David Maybury-Lewis 
recalls the sheer constemation he caused by almost the fust question he put as a 
nervous neophyte ethnographer to the headman of the Akwe-Shavante village in 
which he had just arrived to do his fieldwork. "What is your daughter's name?" 
[1984]. Frantic consultations ensued prompted, fust, by the multiplicity of possible 
answers to the question; and, secondly, by its impolite nature. Work on other Ama-
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zonian peoples confirm that they too find such direct questioning about names 
unacceptable (egs. Bamberger on the Kayapo [1974, p.364]; Ramos on the Sanumá 
[1974, p.I72]). How odd that we actually address people by their names. Among 
the Moslem Kandayan of North-west Borneo, and the Nigerian Oru-Igbo, the 
impoliteness of addressing people by their given names is avoided by the use of 
'greeting-names'. These may be descriptive, often slightingly so. For example, 
there is the freckled-faced Kandayan boy addressed as silalat (tay-talat, excrement 
of flies) [Maxwell, 1984, pp.35-6]; and the less than assiduous Igbo man greeted 
as, 'he eats while the others farm' [Jell-Bahlsen, 1989, p.203]. Or they may consti-
tute a kind of fomulaic word-game in which the greeting name elicits a congruent 
response, exchanges which, according to Jell-Bahlsen, serve to confirm a person's 
identity. She gives this example: greeting name - 'if sickness kills somebody'; ans-
wer - 'it goes to the grave with the corpse' [ibid. p.204]. Evans-Pritchard described 
the variety of greeting terms used by Nuer, of which the best known is the ox-
name, after the person's favourite ox which, in te case of a male, would usually be 
the beast given to him on his initiation [1964]. Richard Antoun observes that the 
use of proper names as modes of address, rather than of reference, in the Jordanian 
village of Kufr al-Ma is deprecated since it ignores the several forms of address 
available as means of indicating respect[1968]. 
We know of many other, perhaps less exotic circumstances in which formal 
names are not used. In Lewis [Mewett, 1982 and East Sutherland [Dorian, 1970] 
the coincidence of given name, patronymic and surname is so frequent that other 
means are required to distinguish among individuals. Segalen finds a similar issue 
of homonymy in Bigouden-sud. Hence we find 'substitute naming systems' 
[Dorian, ibid.] or nicknames, 'by-names', popular names or surnoms, perhaps refe-
ITing to physical characteristics, place of birth or residence, personal idiosyncrasy 
or whatever. For similar reasons, in Barbados and Bermuda nicknames are in 
widespread use among all but the elect and the elite, and are supplemented by the 
owner's car registration number, even in public announcements of mariage or 
death [Manning, 1974]. In many societies, these descriptive 'informal' names were 
formalised in due course into family names, as was the case among Kurdistani 
Jews on emigration [S abar, 1974] and for Mexcan Indians in Zinacantan in a pro-
cess linked to lineage segmentation [Collier & Bricker, 1970]. 
To add to these complications is another which I mentioned earlier, also ubi-
quitous, in which the name of the individual changes at various moments during 
hislher life. According to Needham, the Borneo Penan change and/or add names as 
their children are born or as significant kin die [1964; 1965; and also see 1971]. 
Writing about the Phillipine Ilongot, Rosa1do argues that such name changes 
should be regarded as indicative of social relationships and of egalitarianism, rat-
her than of social classification [1984]. Through them the individua1's identity is 
manipu1ated by hislher significant others, as in the Moroccan nisbah, the identity 
tag a fixed lo a person by others which refers to what they regard as the person's 
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salient associations [Rosen, 1984]. Yet again we see views of naming as a means 
by which society attempts to make the self. 
A similar argument has been used in respect of Bimanese Islanders, whose 
naming conventions a]so connote the primacy of kinship since, on becoming a 
parent, a person assumes a teknonym, referring to his/her eldest child. This is not 
uncommon elsewhere. But the Bimanese go further: on becoming grandparents, 
people replace their teknonyms with 'paidonyms', referring to the name of the first 
grandchild [Brewer, 1981, p.206]. Lopes da Silva reports that after initiation, a 
Xavante boy is given the name of his mother's brother; but since adult homonymy 
is proscribed, the uncle has simultaneously to divest himself of his old name and 
take a new one [1989, p.384]. For the Xavante, names may be 'individual identi-
fiers', but they are also public and corporate property, intended for distribution rat-
her than for private hoarding [ibid.,p.336]. 
All of this is customarily explained as a means of imprinting society on the 
initiate's blank consciousness. Even when this is done through ostensibly superna-
tural devices, the ritual is nevertheless given social reference to the exclusion of 
the personal. I offer you two examples. The Sanumá Indians, Brasilian hunter-gat-
herers, name their children after forest animals. An animal of the chosen species is 
ritually hunted and killed by the father after he has observed appropriate taboos 
[Ramos, 1974]. It is not a random choice, for the child will be invested with the 
spirit of the animal which will enter through its lower spine. However, this does 
not betoken an ideology of human-animal symbiosis, nor even a form of totemic 
belief. Grafted on to it through te ritual sequences of naming are practical and 
pragmatic statements of social balance: betwen kinship and affinity; between agna-
tic and non-agnatic kinship, statements which correct the biases of formal social 
organisation. So the child who is supposedly named for an eponymous coccyx spi-
rit is actually an ambulant depiction of the sanumá ideal of social normality. 
The second example. While Jewish naming in the pre-exilic biblical era 
strictly avoided the repetition of forebears' names - since not to do so would tradu-
ce the uniqueness of the original holder - in post-exilie times, such repetition, refe-
rring to grandparents, became normal. In the post- Talmudic period Sephardic 
Jews established the practice which they still routinely follow of naming children 
after living relatives; Ashkenazim, more fearful of the fallibility of dangerous spi-
rits which might attack the wrong person, restricted repetition to the names of alre-
ady-deceased forebears, as they still do. Rabbi Jacob Lauterbach finds no theologi-
cal rationale either in any of these practices nor in their transformations. They 
were circumstantial [1970]. It does not take much ingenuity to see why, histori-
cally; Jewish emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual might give way to stres-
sing continuity - to the extent that individuality becomes so masked that even the 
Angel of Death can be misled. But this broad historical view utterly ignores the 
self-perception of the named individual and, as in the Sanumá case, simply assu-
mes that this would be congruent with a sociallogic. 
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There would not appear to be much room for the 'authorial self' in these 
views of selfhood and naming. In almost all of them, naming is a means of placing 
the individual in the social matrix. Where is the individual's exercise of her/his 
own discretion? Where is the discretionary self anything more than the dependent 
variable of social structure and historical circumstance? 
My final example is one of the most noted in the literature, Goodenough's 
famous comparison of naming in two Oceanic societies, Truk (in the Caroline 
Islands) and Lakalai (on the north coast of New Britain). On Truk, personal names 
are unique to individuals. On lakalai, by contrast, they are extremely limited, and 
other strictly coded forms of address are used. 
So, while Truk naming clearly emphasises individuality, Lakalai naming 
stresses the social order [p.27l]. The apparently obvious inferences to be drawn 
about the relative rights to individuality in each society would, however, be quite 
wrong. Truk social organisation is firmly based on matrilineal descent groups 
whose lineage elders exercise near-absolute authority over the decisions of their 
juniors. Individuality exists, quite literally, in nothing more than name [p.273]. 
Lakalai presents the obverse case. Public values emphasise individual achie-
vement; lineages have few corporate functions; and leadership, like that of the 
Melanesian Big Man, is sustained tactically rather than based on seniority. While, 
in Truk, personal virtue elicits nothing, in Lakalai it is everything. The lakalai are 
rugged individualists, and their apparently contradictory naming conventions are 
to be understood as 'continual reminders that people are, after all, part of a social 
order' [p.274]. 
Goodenough concludes that names communicate ideas of the self and of self-
other relationships [p.275]. His account reveals with the greatest clarity the con-
ventional modus operandi in the anthropology of naming and, more generally, of 
identity: the asumption of an isomorphism between the anthropo-logic of interpre-
tation, and the ways in which the persons thus named made sense of and supplied 
meaning to their selfhood and their experience of being named. We constructed 
cultures in the images of our own intellectual consciousness, and then derived sel-
ves from them. 
My forenames do not convey to me any message about myself. The same may 
or may not be true of others present-I simply do not know, and would not wish to 
presume. Yet, anthropologists did routinely make such presumptions about the 
bearers of 'other cultures'. Because their naming forms differed from 'ours', we 
seemed to suppose that they must be sociologically significant, and further suppo-
sed that individuals would think alike about the social significance of their names 
and naming practices. 
Of course, part of our error lay, and stilllies, in applying to all of these forms 
of appellation and reference the culture-specific verbal category of 'name'. If we 
used different words to describe what these terms actually do - signify respect; 
address amI/or refer to someone; denigrate, greet or associate a person with his 
forebeas, then we might not be led into the naive assumption that other cultures 
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simplify or compromise the self as much as, or to a greater extent than we do [see 
Zabeeh, 1968, p. 65]. We recognise 'religion', 'kinship', 'politics' as culturally-
biased semantic discriminations; why not 'name' as well? 
But our theoretical construction of other people's selfhood is not merely a 
technical fallacy, nor a mistake of anthropology alone. First, it is in the nature of 
social interaction. We can only engage with people if we can model for ourselves 
their mentalities. How else could we have expectations of them? But what we are 
doing in this process is denying people their selves - or, rather, we are supplying 
selves to them and assuming that there is no dissonance between our construction 
of their selves, and their sense of their selves. In making the kinds of assumption 
we have witnessed about the social and personal significance of names and their 
meanings, we neglect people's self-consciousness and, in so doing, deny them the 
right to self. 
Whether or not societies themselves deny selfhood to novice members 
through naming and initiation rituals, our rendering of these rituals has certainly 
done so. We see this in the doctrinal interpretations of Chisungu and Mukanda. 
These were based on generalisation from the exegeses of indigenous ritual specia-
lists which, in privileging the sociological significance of the rituals, neglected 
utterly the meanings which initiation may have had to the individuals concemed. 
Our literature is full of similar accounts of socially scripted personhood. I object 
particularly to that view of initiation which sees the addition of a novel aspect of 
identity as being tantamount to a remaking of the self. It can not be such a thing. 
Initiation may add to the self's span of potential experience, but even in the most 
extreme cases, such as entry into a monas tic order, it does not, because it can not, 
amount to a discarding of the former self. One may dislike one's past; even 
attempt to distance oneself from it; but it is not discardable as a component of the 
self. Doctrinal interpretation is just a convenient way of inventing the self to suit 
our own intellectual purposes - 'ethnocentric intellectual gimnastics' 
[Tumbull,op.cit. ,p.5l]. 
I must briefly mention also two other calumnies which are frequently uttered 
in the social science invention of social selfhood. The first confuses individualism 
with individuality treating bot as the pursuit of self-interest. The second sees the 
self as a peculiarly Westem concept. A recent example of the first is Walter 
GoldschmidCs argument that selfhood is not determined by social structure but has 
its origins in neurophysiological drives to self-gratification which are later tansfor-
med by culture into the aspiration for prestige [1990]. Goldschmidt sees the task of 
culture (being itself the product of biological evolution) as the discovery of means 
to transform into communicable and acceptable social behaviour the putative fact 
that the neural development of the infant demands a strong emotional and tactile 
relationship which, in due course, inclines the maturing individual to become 
'affect-hungry' [p.32] and to seek other kinds of self-gratification. The individual 
is thus self-driven ('motivated') rather than society-driven, but in a specific direc-
tion. Goldschmidt draws on a wide range of ethnographies to come to the somew-
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hat unsurprising conclusion that ritual is a ubiquitous means through which socie-
ties tackle the common imperative of restraining the self. This is a pretty bleak 
view: that we require ritual to neutralise self-interest at the cost of self-awareness. 
The second common misinterpretation is of self-awareness as a peculiarly 
Westem concem which arises from the propensity of Westem thought to strict seg-
mentation. This rather indiscriminate account of 'Westem' culture was recently 
restated in a tour-de-force by the Chinese geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan [1982]. He 
depicts the Westem self as an aspect of the person which historically has become 
increasingly segmented and introspective, replicating the tendency to segmentation 
which is observable in all aspects of 'civilisation' from domestic to theatrical 
space and the conventions of cuisine. 
It is a remarkably sustained argument, yet is built on a false assumption: that 
in 'premodem' societies, the self is irreducible; later, in modemity, it becomes 
separable into discrete components. But this is merely old-fashioned role theory of 
a kind which has been animating debate among social psychologists for decades. 
Tuan's evidence that societies such as Dinka, Tswana and Wintu are 'unpartitio-
ned', i.e. do not discriminate between the self and the collectivity, has been well-
rehearsed in the literature, but is unconvincing. It confuses cultural theories con-
ceming the power and efficacy of personal agency with cultural theories of selfho-
od and self-awareness, echoing a similar mistake made earlier by anthropologists 
such as Lienhardt and Zahan. 
If, as the social psychologist Ralph Tumer has long argued, roles are accre-
tions of the self, rather than its divisions [egs. 1962; 1987], then there is no basis 
for discriminating a priori between concepts of the self in 'pre- modem' and 
'modem', or non-westem and westem societies, or whatever other of these tired 
old dichotomies one wishes to parade. It is a mark of our own intellectual naivete 
that we have sceptically required anthropologists to prove the existence and 
saliency of selfhood in other cultures. 
Where, then, does all this lead? I regret that I do not have a dazzling substan-
tive conclusion to put before you, but only an assertion. Because of the nature of 
our research, intensive fieldwork among small numbers of people, people whom 
we come to know sufficiently well that we can distinguish among them as indivi-
duals, we are uniquely placed to reveal society and culture are aggregates of 
selves. Although we may disagree among ourselves theoretically on the nature of 
their individuation and their aggregation, that view acknowledges that we are dea-
ling with self-aware, self-conscious individuals,not with replicates in miniature of 
the statistical tendencies or behavioural models attributable to our ways of repre-
senting the social generality. 
Of course the self is elusive; self consciousness is not easily amenable to aca-
demic study. The self is a mystery which neither society nor anthropology can 
reveal precisely or demonstrably. We have to rely on disciplined interpretation and 
imagination. But this difficulty is not a warrant for us imply to neglect the meaning 
of the Chisungu to a Bemba candidate in favour of the interpretation offered by the 
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ritual specialist; it does not entitle us to dismiss my Whalsay friend's claim to 
his'rights' as a rnisuse of the English language or of a legal and philosophical con-
cept. 




'Muhammad son of Abdullah?' 
'Abdullah who?' 
'Abdullah son of Muharnmad. ' 
'Muharnmad who?' 
'Muharnmad son ofBilal.' [Davis, 1989, p.109.] 
Anthropologists know enough to realise that this ritualised recitation is neither 
a factual rehearsal of descent, nor a comprehensive statement of identity. Why is 
narning a matter for ritual? Our customary answer has be en that ritual establishes 
society's rights over the named individual who, in turn, is the reby instructed in the 
obligations of social membership. But the other competence of ritual, hitherto 
neglected in our accounts, is that it pro vides means through which individuals 
construct the terms of their membership, establish the meanings of selfhood and 
society to them, rehearse their rights to their selves, selves whose public mystery 
they can sustain precisely because they are masked by ritual. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alford,R.A.: Naming and Identity: a cross-cultural study of personal naming 
practices. HRAF Press. New Haven, 1987. 
Antoun. R.: On the significance of names in an Arab village. Etnology,7. 1968. 
pp.158-170. 
Bamberger, J.: Naming and the transmission of status in a central Brazilian 
society. Ethnology 13,1974. pp. 363-78. 
Barley, N.: Symbolic structures: an exploration of the culture of the Dowayos. 
C:U.P. Cambridge, 1983. 
Barth,F.: Ritual and Knowlodge among the Bahktaman of New Guinea. Yale 
University Press. New Haven, 1975. 
Brewer, J.D.: Bimanese personal names: meaning and use. Ethnology,20., 1981. 
pp. 203-215. 
157 
Charles, L.H.: Drama in first-naming ceremonies. Joumal of American Folklore, 
64. 1951. pp. 11-65. 
Carrithers, M. et al, (eds.): The Category of the Person: Anthroplogy, XXPhilo-
sophy, History. e.U.P. Cambridge, 1985. 
Cohen, A.P.: La tradition britannique, et la question de l'autre in M. Segalen 
(ed.) L'autre et le semblable: régards sur l'ehnologie des sociétés contem-
poraines, Presses du CNRS, Paris, 1989. pp. 35-51 (Published in English as 
Self and other in the tradition of british anthropology, Anthropologieal 
Joumal on European Cultures, 1 (1), pp. 35-63,1990). 
Cohen, A.P., in press (a): Self concious Anthropology in J. Okely and H. Calla-
way (eds), Anthropology and autobiography, Routledge, London. 
Cohen, A.P., in press (b): The personal right to identity: the self in the 
XX"Enterprise Culture". in P. Heelas and P. Morris (eds.) The Values of 
the Enterprise Culture: The Moral Debate, Unwin Hyman.London 
Cohen, A.P., in press (e): The future of the self: Anthropology and the city in A. 
P. Cohen and K. Fukui (eds.), The age of the City: Japanese and Western 
Anthropological Perspectives, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
Colllier, G.A. & Brieker, v.R.: Nicknames and Social structure in Zinacatan, 
American Anthropologist, 72, 1970. pp. 289-302. 
Criek, B.: Citizenship: True or False? A challenge to the Convention (The 
fourth James Cameron Commemoration Adress), Bulletin of the Seottish 
Couneil for Civil Liberties, Glasgow, 1990. 
Davis, J. : The social relations of the production of history in E. Tonkin et al 
(eds.) History and Ethnicity Routledge. London, 1989. pp. 104-20. 
Dorian, N.e.: A substitute name system in the Scotish Highlands, American 
Anthropologist, 72.1970. pp. 303-19. 
Evans-Pritehard, E.: Nuer modes of adress in D. Hymes (ed.) Language in Cul-
ture and Society : A Reader in Linguistic and Anthropology. Harper and 
Row, London, 1990. pp. 221-27. 
Goldsehmidt, W.: The Human Career: The Self in the Symbolic World, Blaek-
well. Oxford, 1990. 
Goodenough,W.: Personal names and modes of adress in two Oceanic societies. 
M.E. Spiro (ed.) Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology. Free 
Press. New York, 1965. 
Guemple, D.L.: Saunik name sharing as afactor governing Eskimo kinship 
terms. Ethnology, 4. 1965. pp. 323-35. 
Harré, R.: The social construction of selves in K. Yardley and T. Hohness (eds.), 
Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives, John Wylie and Sons Ltd. 
Chiehester, 1987. pp. 41-42. 
158 
Jell-Bahlsen, S.: Names and naming: instances from the Oru-Igbo, Dialectical 
Anthropology, 13 (2). 1988. pp. 199-207. 
Lauterbach,J.R.: The naming of children in Jewish folklore, ritual and 
practice. in B.J. Bamberger, (eds.) Studies in Jewish Law Custom and Fol-
klore, KTAV Publishing House lnc. NEw York, 1970. pp. 30-74. 
León,M.: Of Names and First Names in a Small Rural Community: linguistic 
and sociological approaches. Semiotica, 17 (3), 1976. pp. 211-31. 
Lévi-Strauss,C.: The Savage Mind, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. London, 1966. 
Lopes Da Silva,A: Social Practice and Ontology in Akwe-Savante Naming and 
Myth, Etnology, 28 (4).1989. pp. 331-341. 
Manning, F.G.: Nicknames and numberplates in the British West Indies. Jour-
nal of American Folklore, 87 (2).1974. pp. 123-132. 
Maxwell, A.R.: Kanayan personal names and naming in E. Tooker, (ed.) 
Naming Systems: The 1980 Proceedings of the American Ethnological 
Society. AES. Washington, 1984. pp- 25-39. 
Maybury-Lewis, D.: Name, Person and Ideology in Central Brazil, in E. Too-
ker, (ed.), Naming Systems: The 1980 Proceedings of the American Eth-
nological Society. AES. Washington, 1984. pp. 1-10. 
Mewett, P.G.: Exiles, nicknames, social identies and the production of local 
consciousness in a Lewis crofting community, in AP. Cohen, (ed.), Belon-
ging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures, M.U.P. 
Manchester, 1982. pp. 222-46.74 
Needham,R.: The system of teknonyms and death-names among the Penan, 
South- western Journal of Anthropology, 10. 1954. pp. 416-31. 
Needham, R.: Death-names and solidarity in Penan society. Bijdragen etc, 121, 
1965. pp. 58-76. 
Needham, R.: Penan Friendship Names. in T. Beidelman, (ed.) The Translation 
of Culture. Tavistock. London, 1971. 
Ramos, AR.: How the Sanumá acquire their names. Ethnology, 13 (2). 1974. 
pp. 171-185. 
Richards, Al.: Chisungu: A Girl's lnitiation Ceremony in Northern Rhodesia, 
Faber. London, 1956. 
Rosaldo, R.: Ilongont naming: the Play of associations, in E. Tooker, (ed.) 
Naming Systems: The 1980 Procedings of the American Ethnological 
Society. AES. Washington, 1984. pp- 11-24. 
Rose,N.: Governing the Soul: the Shaping of the Private Self. Routledge. Lon-
don, 1990. 
Rosen, C.: Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a 
Muslim Community. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984. 
159 
Rossi, A.S.: Naming children in middle-class families. American Sociological 
Review, 30, 1965. pp. 499-513. 
S abar, Y.: First names, nicknames and family names among the Jews of Kur-
distan. Jewish Quaterly Review, 65 (1), 1974. pp. 43-53. 
Segalen, M.: Le nom caché. L'Home, 20 (4),1980. pp. 63-76. 
Taussig, M.: Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man. University of Chicago 
Press. Chicago, 1986. 
Tuan, Y.F.: Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Life and Individual Conscious-
ness. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis, 1982. 
Tumbull,C.: Liminality: a synthesis of subjective and objective experience in 
R Schechner and W. Appel (eds.), By Means ofPerformance: Intercultural 
Studies of Theatre and Ritual, C. u.P. Cambridge, 1990. pp. 50-81. 
Tumer, RH.: Role-taking: process versus conformity in A.M. Rose, (Ed.) 
Human Behavior and Social Processes. Routledge. London, 1962. pp. 19-
32. 
Tumer, RH.: Articulating self and social structure in K. Yardley and T. Hoh-
ness, (eds.), Self and Society: Psychosocial Perspectives. John Wylie & Son. 
Chichester, 1987. pp. 19-32. 
Tumer, V.W.: The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual. Comell Uni-
versity Press. Ithaca, 1967. 
Wagner,R: Lethal speech: Daribi Myth as Symbolic Obviation. Comell Univer-
sity Press. Ithaca, 1978. 
Zabeeh, F.: What is in a name? An Enquiry into the Semantics and Pragmatics 
ofProper Names. Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, 1968. 
Zonabend, F.: Le nom de personne. L'Hornme, 20 (4),1980. pp. 7-23. 
160 
